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I. INTRODUCTION 
A traffic officer is a common sight on the highways 
and byways of New Zealand. Seting forth, resplendent 
in uniform as a visible presence of law and order in 
our society, a traffic officer is charged with the 
task of ensuring the efficient and safe progress of 
traffic over our roads. 
To perform these tasks, a traffic officer is given a 
number of powers in the Transport Act 1962. The more 
important of these powers can be briefly listed. 
Section 66, which gives a traffic officer the power 
to stop moving vehicles. 
Section 58A, which gives a traffic officer the power 
to administer breath tests to motorists, and require 
motorists to accompany an officer to undergo further 
tests. 
Section 68B, which gives a traffic officer the power 
to inspect vehicles, issue notices requiring people to 
remove their vehicles from the road, require a name 
and address, and order vehicles to be towed away. 
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Section 62, which gives an officer the power to 
arrest drivers under the influence of drink and drugs 
in certain situations. 
Except where a traffic officer has been given special 
powers by statute, an officer is in the same position 
as a normal citizen. Thus if an officer interferes 
with the rights of a motorist when acting outside the 
ambit of the powers given, then the officer is answerable 
to the law. 
There are two consequences for a traffic officer who 
does act unlawfully and infringes the rights of a 
motorist, other than the possibility of a criminal 
charge. The first is that the officer becomes liable 
to a tort action in respect of the wrong. The second 
is that any evidence in relation to an offence committed 
by a motorist gained while the officer was acting 
illegally, may be excluded in court at the judge's 
discretion. 
Comparatively few tort actions are brought against 
the Ministry of Transport or its officers. This is 
predominantly a result of the fact that many motorists 
who do have a grievance against a traffic officer will 
also be charged with an offence. They will therefore 
use any illegality on an officer's part as a means to 
escape conviction, rather than as the basis for a 
tort action. But Courts have recognised tortious 
conduct on the part of a traffic officer when it has 
occurred. Thus in Ministry of Transport v. Payn1 
the Court recognised that an officer committed a 
2 trespass; in Ministry of Transport v. Edwards the 
officer was held to have made an illegal forced 
3 entry; in Connolly v. Ministry of Transport the 
officer's conduct in requiring a person to accompany 
him when he had no power to do so was held to be 
4 illegal; in White v. Ministry of Transport an 
officer was stated to have illegally detained a 
motorist; and in Stowers v. Auckland City Council
5 
an officer was recognised as having assaulted a 
person. 
These events illustrate that it is necesary to examine 
the limits of an officer's powers to see how far they 
extend, and in what situations a tort is committed. 
As it is a traffic officer's role in stopping and 
detaining moving vehicles which is most contentious, 
this paper will concentrate solely on the issue of 
false imprisonment. In particular, it will deal with 
false imprisonment which may arise in the drinking-
driving and random stopping areas. 
5 
II. FALSE IMPRISONMENT 
(A) The Tort of False Imprisonment Defined 
False imprisonment is a somewhat misleading name 
for the tort. False does not mean 'fallacious' 
here, but rather is used in the sense of 'wrongful' 
or 'unjustified'. Also, there is no need for 
actual imprisonment to occur for the tort to 
arise. The unlawful detention can be either 
custodial or non-custodia1 6 , and it is enough 
that the plaintiff has been in any manner 
completely deprived of liberty. 
The emphasis in false imprisonment does not seem 
to be as much on whether the plaintiff actually 
was imprisoned, as on the plaintiff's state of 
mind - did the plaintiff believe on reasonable 
grounds that he or she was imprisoned? Thus 
false imprisonment will include a situation 
7 where 
submission to the control of another is 
procured by assertion of legal authority, 
as when a store detective or (even more) a 
policeman without actually laying hands on 
the plaintiff or formally arresting him, 
gives him to understand that he must submit 
or else be compelled. 
( B) 
6 
This view of false imprisonment is especially 
relevant to the case of a traffic officer,whose 
standing as a law enforcement agent ranks somewhere 
between a store detective and a policeman. 
False imprisonment will thus occur any time when 
a plaintiff is actively confined or prevented 
from exercising the privilege of leaving the 
place where he or she is. False imprisonment 
must necessarily be detention against the will 
of the plaintiff. 
Blundell v. The Attorney General 
for False Imprisonment 
Ramifications 
8 This case established that in order for 
someone to be lawfully detained, the person 
detaining them (in that case a constable) must 
be able to point to a specific legal power 
authorising the detention. If there is no legal 
power authorising the detention, then the detention 
is unlawful and will be actionable in tort. 
False imprisonment, it was noted in the case, 
occurs when there is actual physical custody 
over a person. But it also includes 9 
the much rarer case of a restraint in 
liberty of movement ... extending possibly 
1111 
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over only a brief time, but nonetheless by 
definition an imprisonment, a notional 
imprisonment and, if wrongful, actionable 
as false imprisonment. 
It is often this latter type of brief detention a 
traffic officer may exercise over a motorist, 
which forms the basis of the tort actions discussed 
in this paper. 
(C) Consent as a Defence to False Imprisonment 
The major bar to a successful false imprisonment 
action in tort is the question of consent. If 
it can be shown that a person chose voluntarily 
to remain with another, while at all times both 
being free and believing himself or herself to 
be free to leave, then there is no false 
. . 10 imprisonment However consent must be 
genuine. That is to say that it is not consent 
where a person submits because that person 
believes that any protest made would simply be 
ignored. Nor is it consent if the submission is 
gained by a trick or if the purported 'consent' 
is given to avoid a worse consequence - perhaps 
it is given under threat of physical violence 
. . 11 
or arrest, or to avoid an embarrassing scene • 
1111 
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The issue of consent in relation to a traffic 
officer who detains a motorist will be dealt with 
in more detail later. It is only necessary to 
note here, that if a motorist believes there is 
no choice but to do as a traffic officer instructs, 
then this "consent" will not be a bar to a 
successful false imprisonment action. 
(D) False Imprisonment in Traffic Situations 
False imprisonment arises in the traffic context 
in primarily two situations. 
The first is where an officer 'interrupts' a 
motorist's journey. That is, an officer stops a 
motorist pursuant to section 66 and keeps that 
motorist there for a short time, before allowing 
him or her to resume the journey. The key point 
to note is that the 'imprisonment' is for a 
relatively short time, and that section 66 is 
the only power which an officer purports to use. 
Thus if section 66 is used invalidly, an officer's 
actions will amount to a false imprisonment. 
The second situation where a false imprisonment 
can arise is when an officer 'detains' a motorist. 
1111 
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This is where an officer has either used section 
66 to stop a vehicle or has come across an already 
stationary vehicle and is using another power 
{perhaps section 58A or section 68B) to keep a 
motorist present. If the power used to detain a 
motorist is used unlawfully, then again a false 
imprisonment action will lie against the officer. 
\0 
III. THE POWERS OF THE TRAFFIC OFFICER 
(A) Powers Under the Transport Act 1962 
In order to deal with the issue of false 
imprisonment, it becomes necessary to examine 
the specific statutory authorities under which a 
traffic officer operates. For as Blundell v. 
Attorney Genera1 12 implied, unless an officer 
can point to one of these specific powers, then 
there is no authority to stop or detain anyone. 
The most important of a traffic officer's powers 
is section 66 of the Transport Act 1962, here 
set out in full: 
5,66. On demand by constable or traffic 
officer, user of vehicle to stop and give 
name and address - (1) The user of a vehicle 
shall stop at the request or signal of a 
constable or traffic officer in uniform or 
of a traffic officer who is wearing a cap, 
hat or helmet which identifies him as a 
traffic officer, and on demand give him his 
name and address and state whether or not 
he is the owner of the vehicle, and, if he 
is not the owner of the vehicle, shall also 
give the name and address of the owner. 
( 2) Any person co"uni ts an offence who fails 
1111 
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to comply with any provision of subsection 
(1) of this section, and may be arrested by 
any constable without warrant. 
This is the only power a traffic officer has to 
stop a moving vehicle, and as such it is the 
cornerstone of all an officer's powers. It is 
also the section which allows an officer to 
obtain the driver and vehicle owner's details. 
This is important because it allows the officer 
to acquire information which is needed to issue a 
traffic infringement notice in respect of an 
offending motorist. Thus section 66 is the 
starting point of most of the prosecutions which 
the traffic department will bring. 
At this stage, it appears there are no 
prerequisites placed on an officer before he can 
exercise the power to stop under this section. 
A traffic officer also has a range of other 
powers which can be used to detain motorists and 
their vehicles in various situations. The 
majority of these powers, as stated earlier, are 
set out in sections 58A, 68B, and 62 of the 
Transport Act 1962. As they are particularly 
relevant, parts of section 58A and section 68B 
are set out below. 
I~ 
S.58A. Breath tests - (1) Where an enforcement 
officer has good cause to suspect that -
(a) The driver of a motor vehicle on any 
road has recently, before driving the 
vehicle, or has, while driving the 
vehicle, consumed drink: or 
(b) Any person attempting to drive a 
motor vehicle on any road has recently, 
before attempting to drive the vehicle, 
or has while attempting to drive the 
vehicle, consumed drink: or 
(c) Any person has recently committed an 
offence against this Part of this 
Act, or against any regulations 
authorised by section 77 of this Act 
and made under section 199 of this 
Act, that involves the use of a motor 
vehicle -
he may require that driver or person to 
undergo forthwith a breath screening test. 
(3) If -
(a) It appears to an enforcement officer 
that a breath screening test undergone 
by a person pursuant to a requirement 
under this section indicates that the 
proportion of alcohol in the person's 
breath exceeds 400 micrograms of 
alcohol per litre of breath: or 
(b) A person, having been required by an 
enforcement officer pursuant to this 
section to forthwith undergo a breath 
screening test, fails or refuses to do 
so: or 
(c) An enforcement officer could, pursuant 
to this section require a person to 
undergo forthwith a breath screening 
test, but a breath screening device 
1111 
is not readily available or for any 
person a breath screening test cannot 
then be carried out -
the enforcement officer may require the 
person to accompany him to any place where 
it is likely that the person can undergo 
either an evidential breath test or a blood 
test, or both. 
68B. Powers of constable and traffic officers 
- (1) Every constable or traffic officer, if 
for the time being in uniform or in possession 
of any warrant or other evidence of his 
authority as a constable or traffic officer, 
is hereby authorised to enforce the provisions 
of this Act and the Road User Charges Act 
1977 and any regulations or bylaws in force 
under those Acts and section 148 of the 
Public Works Act 1981 and any regulations 
in force under section 243(l)(a) of that 
Act, and in particular may at any time -
(a) Direct any person being in charge of 
or in any vehicle, whether on a road 
or not, or any person on any road to 
furnish his name and address and 
information as is within his knowledge 
and as may lead to the identification 
of the driver or person in charge of 
any vehicle: 
(b) Inspect, test, and examine the brakes 
or any other part of any vehicle on 
any road or any equipment thereof; 
(2) Any such constable or traffic officer, 
if he believes on reasonable grounds that 
any vehicle does not comply with the provisions 
of any regulations for the time being in 
force under this Act, may, by notice in 
--
'~ 
writing given to the driver or owner of the 
vehicle, direct that the vehicle be not used 
on any road, and that notice shall continue 
in force until the vehicle has been made to 
comply with the provisions of any such 
regulations as aforesaid: 
Provided that any such notice may be subject 
to a condition to the effect that the vehicle 
may continue to be used to reach any specified 
place for repair or may continue to be used 
for a given time or under limitations as to 
speed or route or otherwise. 
It is to be noted that there is no power in these 
sections to stop moving vehicles. They apply 
solely in relation to stationary vehicles. However 
there is implicit in these sections a duty on the 
motorist to remain for a reasonable time while a 
traffic officer exercises these powers, in situations 
where the officer is entitled to use them. 
It is submitted that where a motorist commits an 
offence, a traffic officer can use section 66 to 
stop the motorist and ascertain the motorist's 
name and address. It is also submitted that where 
an officer "comes across" a stationary vehicle, 
then the officer is entitled to exercise powers 
such as those given in sections SSA and 68B, and 
the motorist must remain while the officer does so. 
But two problems emerge. The first is whether the 
officer can use section 66 to stop a vehicle when 
1111 
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no offence has been committed, and therefore where 
the officer can have no desire or need for the 
motorist or vehicle owner's name and address. The 
second is, if a vehicle is stopped pursuant to 
section 66, in what circumstances is an officer 
entitled to go on and use other powers in relation 
to stationary vehicles? 
These problems manifest themselves, in particular, 
in the contentious drinking-driving area. Can 
section 66 be used to stop vehicles at random, 
when the officer has no suspicion that an offence 
has been committed, and thus has no need for the 
motorist's name and address? The purpose of the 
stop in this situation is to see if the motorist 
has been drinking. Also, can a traffic officer 
who stops a motorist under section 66 then go on 
and use powers under section 58A to require a 
breath test? 
(B) The Ministry of Transport's Practice 
The Ministry of Transport have regarded section 66 
as a general all-purpose stopping provision. They 
believed that it was open to an officer to use 
section 66 at any time, and that there were no 
prerequisites needed, (such as suspicion that an 
1111 
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offence had been committed), before the power to 
stop could be invoked. The Ministry further 
believed that once an officer had stopped a vehicle 
under section 66, then that officer was in all 
circumstances entitled to go on and exercise 
other powers available under the Transport Act. 
In particular, the Ministry believed that section 
66 gave them the power to stop vehicles at random 
to check on drinking drivers,and to then go on and 
demand breath tests under section 58A if the 
circumstances warranted. 
The Ministry's view of the way their officers' 
powers could be used was backed up by two cases in 
particular. These two cases are Felton v. Auckland 
City Counci1 13 and Maxwell v. Police
14 , both 
of which have been cited in Parliament by the 
current Minister of Transport in support of random 
. 15 
stopping 
These cases are important in that they deal with 
both points of contention stated earlier. Both 
16 17 
Felton's case and Maxwell's case clearly 
state that a traffic officer does not need any 
prerequisites (except those of uniform as set out 
in section 66) in order to exercise the power to 
1111 
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stop moving vehicles. To quote Chilwell Jin 
Felton's case: 18 
there is nothing in the Act which requires 
as a condition precedent that the Traffic 
Officer must have some reason for stopping the 
motorist. 
The cases go on to say that once a motorist has 
been stopped pursuant to section 66, a traffic 
officer can then go on and exercise other powers 
in the Transport Act, and in particular the power 
to demand a breath test under section 58A. However 
both cases simply assume that section 58A can be 
used in conjunction with a stopping under section 
66. No authority is cited in support of the 
proposition, except in Maxwell's case 20 where 
O'Regan J cites the High Court decision of Police 
21 v. Roper . 
In 1984 the Court of Appeal overturned the High 
22 Court decision in Roper's case As a result 
of this, both points made in Felton's case and 
Maxwell's case must now be open to doubt. 
18 
(C) The Effect of Roper v. Police 
(i) The facts of the case 
The Court of Appeal's decision in Roper v. 
· 23 1 1 · ' ff. Police paces new imits on a tra ic 
officer's ability to use section 66 in all 
situations, and to use other powers following 
on from a stopping under section 66. However 
because of the highly peculiar and singular 
fact situation that arose in the case, it is 
unclear where the exact limits on the use of 
section 66 lie. 
The facts of the case can be simply stated. 
Two police constables requested Mrs Roper to 
stop the car she was driving. They did so 
pursuant to section 66 of the Transport Act. 
Mrs Roper gave her name and address to the 
constables and stated that she owned the 
car. After inspecting the car and discovering 
three bald tyres, the constables informed 
Mrs Roper she should remain where she was 
until a traffic officer was located to 
issue a notice "writing her off the road", 
pursuant to section 68B(2) of the Transport 
Act 24 . Mrs Roper refused to wait where 
--
-
she was, and drove off. She was later 
arrested and charged with failing to stop 
under section 66. 
After differing decisions in the District 
h h ' d
25 d h Court were s e was acquitte , an t e 
High Court where a conviction was entered 
. h 26 against er , the case came to the Court 
of Appeal. On the very precise facts given, 
the Court of Appeal was able to rule that 
the police constables did not have any power 
to detain Mrs Roper once she had given her 
name and address, and had thus contravened 
the basic principle in Blundell's case
27 
that a person may not detain anyone, except 
where that person has specific statutory 
authority to do so. 
But because of these very precise facts,it 
is not exactly clear where Roper's 
28 case 
places the limit on the ability to use the 
section 66 stopping power, and the ability 
to use other powers in conjunction with it. 
The case appears open to two interpretations. 
(ii) The strict interpretation 
The first interpretation that could be taken 
----.. 
--
---
l.0 
from Roper's case is a strict one, which 
places severe limits on the use of section 
66. 
The Court noted in Roper's case that "the 
duration of the duty under s.66(1) to remain 
stopped is governed by the associated 
1
. · . . .,30 ob igation to supply information. . 
This implies that once the information 
required by section 66 is given, a motorist 
may leave and an officer cannot detain this 
motorist to exercise other powers under the 
Transport Act. As the judgement states 
31 
later 
Once the driver has stopped and has 
supplied the information thereafter 
sought, that obligation to stop (and 
remain stopped) has been exhausted, and 
there is no authority under that section 
for the constable or traffic officer to 
make any further demands on the driver 
at that time. 
By looking at the content and language of 
section 66 and section 68B(2) (which it was 
argued in Court might have entitled the 
constables to keep Mrs Roper present), the 
Court concluded that the two sections were 
32 independent and stated 
it is not possible to import s.68B into 
s.66 in order to enlarge the time during 
which a vehicle must remain stationary, 
once it has been stopped as a result of 
----------
11 
the exercise of the entirely different 
functions described by s. 66. · 
The Court appears to state that section 66 
gives an officer the right to stop a vehicle 
and require the driver and vehicle owner's 
details, and that is all. It cannot be used 
as a means or gateway to the exercise of an 
officer's other powers. The corollary of 
this is that if a traffic officer does stop 
a motorist under section 66 and then detains 
that motorist while going on to use other 
powers, then this will be a false imprisonment. 
(iii) The effect of the strict interpretation 
The effect of the strict interpretation of 
I 
33 ' 1 1' ' h Ropers case is to severe y imit t e use 
a traffic officer can make of section 66 as 
a starting point for the exercise of other 
powers. There is no reason to suppose that 
it is only section 68B which cannot be used 
in conjunction with a stopping under section 
66. The reasoning of the Court would imply 
that no other power can be used following a 
section 66 stopping where "there is no textual 
link between the two sections 1134 . 
One area where this strict interpretation 
will limit a traffic officer, is the area of 
-
•1 
--
-
-
).1 
breath testing. An officer's power to 
require a breath test is given in section 
58A
35
. Under a strict interpretation of 
I 36 ' ld ' Ropers case it wou not now be possible 
to stop a motorist under section 66 and 
then go on to require a breath test under 
section 58A. There is no textual link between 
section 58A and section 66; nothing which 
implies they are to be used together. 
37 
Further, a relevant factor in Roper's case 
in determining that section 66 and section 
68B operated independently, was that there 
was a different uniform requirement for each 
of them respectively. That point indicates 
that section 58A must also be seen as 
independent of section 66. The powers under 
section 58A can be used according to the 
Court in Quirke v. 
38 
Ministry of Transport 
39 
and Kinder v. Ministry of Transport , as 
long as the officer is in possession of his 
or her warrant. In contrast, section 66 
itself requires that an officer be in 
uniform or wearing a cap or helmet before 
powers under this section can be exercised. 
The result of this is that if a strict view 
40 
is taken of the decision in Roper's case, 
------
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it will prevent a traffic officer exercising 
any other powers (including the power to 
breath test) pursuant to a section 66 stopping. 
Therefore if a motorist is detained while 
such a power is exercised, this amounts to a 
false imprisonment. 
(iv) The wide interpretation 
• • • f I 41 A strict interpretation o Ropers case 
will severely restrict the role of a traffic 
officer. It will render an officer virtually 
powerless in respect of a moving vehicle, 
because while there is a power to stop it, 
nothing can be done once the vehicle is stopped, 
except the requiring of the driver or vehicle 
owner's details. The strict interpretation 
also has the effect of making the powers 
given to an officer by section 58A and 
section 68B almost redundant, if they can 
only be exercised when an officer 'comes 
across' a stationary vehicle. 
For these reasons a later Court may seek to 
take a broader interpretation from Roper's 
42 case It may be held that other powers 
--
--------
14-
can be used following a stopping under 
section 66, as long as the section 66 power 
is not abused. 
There is some support for this wider view 
when the real focus of the Court's concern 
Roper's 43 is examined. As noted, case 
Roper's 44 is case a case with a very 
unusual fact situation. It involved both 
in 
the Police and the Traffic Department when 
there was really no need to do so. The 
Police could have issued the notice under 
section 68B(2) themselves - they did not 
need to call in a traffic officer. Further, 
the Police did not purport to use section 
68B(2) to hold Mrs Roper, although it was 
argued in Court that they might have been 
able to. What the Police did do was use 
section 66 as a general holding provision to 
try and detain Mrs Roper until a traffic 
officer arrived - and it was this which the 
Court objected to. They did not feel that 
section 66 could be used - or abused - in 
this way. Perhaps if the Police had made a 
stopping under section 66, and then having 
gained the belief on reasonable grounds as 
to the car's condition immediately gone on 
• --
-
-
lS 
to use section 68B(2) to write the car off 
the road themselves, then the Court would 
have held this was a valid exercise of their 
powers. It was not so much the use of section 
68B pursuant to a section 66 stopping that 
concerned the Court, as the way section 66 
itself was used. 
A further example of the Court's concern that 
the section 66 stopping power should not be 
abused, is the case of Winter v. Auckland 
. C · 145 City ounc1 There, a motorist was 
stopped pursuant to section 66 because he 
was breaking the speed limit. His name and 
address were requested by the traffic officer 
who stopped him. It is unclear whether 
Winter complied with the request or not, but 
he departed shortly afterwards. In a bizarre 
chase which followed, Winter was stopped 
three further times and eventually detained. 
The Court held that46 
there is no power vested in a traffic 
officer or traffic officers in similar 
circumstances to pursue and detain a 
motorist who either fails to give his 
name, address or the registered owner of 
the vehicle which he is driving or 
refuses to produce a motor driver's 
licence. 
( V) 
--
16 
Again the Court was determined to ensure 
that section 66 was not used as a general 
holding provision, but only in the manner 
which its wording and purpose allows. 
In light of this, it is open to a later Court 
t . R , 47 . . . ogive oper s case a wider interpretation, 
and to hold that other powers can be used 
following on from a stopping under section 
66, as long as section 66 itself is not misused. 
The effect of the wide interpretation 
Under a wide interpretation of Roper's 
case 48 the use of section 66 is not so 
restricted. Thus if a motorist is stopped 
by an officer under section 66, and during 
the time the requisite information is being 
sought - or prior to the actual stopping -
that officer forms the intention to exercise 
another power, then that officer may do so, 
as long as the power is exercised immediately. 
There is no abuse of section 66 here, 
because the officer does not 'detain' a 
motorist by using it. Rather, the officer 
detains the motorist under the implied 
1111 
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authority given by the later power - perhaps 
section 688 or section 58A. In such a 
situation there is no abuse of section 66 as 
there was in Roper's case
49
, and therefore 
it may well be a valid exercise of an officer's 
powers. 
In relation to the right to breath test a 
driver who has been stopped under section 
66, the situation under the wide interpretation 
50 of Roper's case was well summed up by 
Hardie-Boys Jin Gifford v. Ministry of 
Transport,when he said
51 
Once the vehicle has stopped, the 
officer must obviously speak to the 
driver, if only to obtain the information 
which s.66 entitles him to recieve. If 
in speaking to the driver, the officer 
becomes aware that the driver has been 
drinking, then he is entitled to require 
a breath test because he has good cause 
to suspect that the circumstances 
contemplated by para (a) of s.SSA(l) apply. 
However even under this wider interpretation 
of Roper's case 52 there are still problems 
for a traffic officer who wishes to breath 
test a driver who has been stopped under 
section 66. This is especially so in the 
checkpoint random stop situation, where an 
officer will not have acquired any suspicion 
1'13 
that an offence has been committed, prior to 
the decision to stop under section 66. 
The problem is that even on the widest 
. . f R , 53 . interpretation o oper s case , section 
66 cannot be used as a general holding 
provision. Therefore if an officer stops a 
motorist under section 66, the motorist 
cannot be detained to see if he or she has 
been drinking - that is, to allow the officer 
time to obtain the 'good cause to suspect' 
that is needed to invoke section 58A powers. 
All the officer can do is ask for the driver's 
or vehicle owner's details, and then the 
motorist is entitled to leave. If during 
this time the officer gets the good cause to 
suspect in terms of section 58A(l), then a 
breath test can be demanded. But if the 
information is forthcoming too quickly, then 
the officer will not have time to see if 
there is "good cause to suspect" - particularly 
as there is no obligation on the motorist to 
wind down the car window. At this point the 
motorist may leave, because the right under 
section 66 to detain has ended. If the 
officer attempts to keep the motorist present 
in order to ascertain if the motorist has 
been drinking, then this detention will 
allow the motorist to bring an action 
against the officer for false imprisonment. 
Similarly, if an officer stops a motorist 
under section 66 and then delays seeking the 
information allowed under that section - in 
order to gain time to see if there is good 
cause to suspect a breath alcohol offence -
then this casts doubt on the good faith in 
using section 66 at all. Here section 66 
would be used not as a means of getting 
information, but as a general holding provision 
until it could be ascertained if an officer 
was entitled to use the section SSA powers to 
demand a breath test. Such a use of section 
66 does not seem lawful since the decision 
I 54 h ' • in Ropers case , and t e detention it 
involves may be actionable in tort as a 
false imprisonment. 
It can thus be strongly argued that the 
decision in Roper's case
55
, whichever 
interpretation is adopted, will place limits 
on when an officer is entitled to use any 
other powers possessed, following on from a 
stopping under section 66. In all probability, 
.. 
-.. .. .. 
--.. 
( D) 
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a later Court will favour a wide interpretation 
of Roper's case
56 
in light of both its 
singular fact situation, and the severe 
limits it would place on the functions of a 
traffic officer if the strict view was 
adopted . 
The Limit on Section 66 as a Power to Stop Vehicles 
at Random 
( i) Section 66 a section for acquiring information 
. 57 . 1 · h An analysis of Roper's case imp 1es tat 
an even more fundamental limit can possibly 
be placed on a traffic officer, which can 
lead to dangers of false imprisonment. It 
is the question of the right of an officer 
to use section 66 at all in certain situations . 
For if section 66 cannot be used, then an 
officer has no authority to stop and 
detain moving vehicles, and to do so would 
be a false imprisonment of the driver. 
There is no question that section 66 can be 
used to stop vehicles if an offence is 
committed. This is because the purpose of 
.. 
section 66 is to allow a motorist or vehicle 
owner's name and address to be acquired, so 
prosecutions can be commenced. 
But can vehicles be stopped at random using 
section 66? The cases of Felton58 and 
59 Maxwell say that they can. These cases 
point out that there is no prerequisite 
required by the section, that an officer 
must suspect the commission of an offence 
before the power to stop vehicles can be 
exercised. On the face of section 66 this 
is true. But it is certainly not tenable to 
suggest that Parliament intended section 66 
to be used simply to 'interrupt' a motorist's 
journey. It thus remains to see when the 
power can be used. 
The only power which section 66 confers on 
an officer upon stopping, is the power to 
60 ask for a name and address - Roper's case 
decides that. So in order for an officer to 
use section 66, an officer must intend to 
obtain these details, or else it will amount 
to stopping a motorist for no purpose at all. 
This would not appear to be a valid exercise 
of the power. 
---
-
An example in point is the stopping of 
vehicles at random at a checkpoint. During 
the course of a checkpoint operation, an 
officer will stop a great many vehicles and 
in most cases there will be no request for 
the details which section 66 allows to be 
sought. Indeed in most cases there will never 
be any intention to ask for these details, 
unless an officer later suspects the commission 
of a drink-driving offence. This does not 
appear to be a legitimate exercise of section 
66. The purpose of section 66 is to allow a 
vehicle to be stopped in order to ascertain 
details concerning the driver or vehicle 
owner, so as to begin proceedings against an 
offending motorist, or to issue a warning or 
the like. The purpose of section 66 does 
not allow it to be used as a general 'stopping 
and holding' provision, so that an officer 
can determine on the 'off-chance' if an 
offence has been committed. 
61 
Roper's case 
appears to have decided that section 66 
cannot be abused as a general holding power 
in this way. 
It is suggested that the judges in Felton's 
62 l' 63 . l"f" d case and Maxwel s case over-simp 1 1e 
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the question of the use of section 66. It is 
further suggested that the true position is 
that a vehicle can be stopped under section 
66 even though there is no suspicion of the 
commission of an offence, but only if the 
traffic officer has some legitimate desire 
for the motorist's name and address. Otherwise 
section 66 would be used for a purpose for 
which, as Roper's case64 stated, it was 
not designed, namely detaining motorists. 
Any motorist so detained would be able to 
sue in tort in respect of this unlawful 
detention. 
An analogy exists here with the English 
cases of R v. Waterfield65 , Beard v. 
Wooa66 and Hoffman v. Thomas 67 . The 
former two cases dealt with the validity of 
a constable's action under a power to stop, 
while the latter dealt with a constable's right 
to regulate traffic. The Courts in these 
cases decided that the powers conferred on 
the police were very wide, but not unlimited. 
The powers must be exercised both in good 
faith, and for purposes contemplated by the 
respective sections or at common law. 
Therefore in Hoffman's case68 a power to 
regulate traffic was held not to include a 
power to force cars to undergo a traffic 
census, because this was not a function 
comtemplated by that section or at common 
law. Similarly in Waterfield's case69 a 
power to stop vehicles was held not to 
include a power to detain a vehicle, unless 
there was good reason for doing so. Applying 
this approach to the New Zealand situation, 
it may be argued that section 66 of the 
Transport Act must be used both in good 
faith, and for purposes contemplated by the 
wording of section 66. Section 66 is not as 
wide as the powers in the English cases. It 
gives guidance as to its use - it is to be 
used by officers to stop vehicles in order 
to obtain the driver or vehicle owner's 
details. Any other use of section 66 would 
be unlawful, just as the use was in Waterfield's 
case 70 and Hoffman's case 71 , because it 
was not contemplated in the purpose of the 
section. It may be argued that this does 
not allow section 66 to be used to stop 
vehicles in order to check for intoxicated 
motorists. Also, because the power must be 
d ' d f . h
72 ' ' use in goo ait , it is not open to an 
officer to stop vehicles and ask for the details 
-
-
-
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allowed just to satisfy the requirements of 
the section, when the true purpose of the 
stopping is to determine if a motorist has 
been drinking. This would be an abuse of 
the power. Thus random stopping under 
section 66 may result in the unlawful detention 
of motorists, albeit for an extremely short 
time. 
(ii) Limits on the discretion given in section 66 
The stopping of motor vehicles is an exercise 
of discretion by an officer1 who has a choice 
as to which vehicles will be stopped. It is 
important to determine if the discretion is 
used correctly, for an incorrect use of the 
power may cause a motorist to be falsely 
imprisoned. 
A recent decision of the House of Lords may 
give guidance as to the approach New Zealand 
Courts will take in the task of reviewing 
the exercise of discretion by a law enforcement 
officer. The case is Mohammed-Holgate v. 
73 Duke . In that case the courts were 
concerned with reviewing the exercise of a 
---
-
constable's statutory discretion to arrest. 
The Court did so by applying the 'Wednesbury 
rules 1 74 , which had predominantly been 
used only in administrative law cases to 
examine discretionary areas of governmental 
and local body activity. Even if a New 
Zealand Court does not choose to apply the 
rules themselves to test the validity of the 
exercise of a discretion to stop vehicles, it 
is submitted that the Courts may at least 
consider similar factors. 
In applying the Wednesbury rules, the House 
of Lords made two inquiries. The first was 
whether the discretion was exercised in good 
faith. The second was whether the constable 
included in the consideration of whether or 
not to exercise the discretion "matters 
which are irrelevant to what he had to 
consider 11 75 . 
If these rules or other similar factors are 
applied to examine the exercise of the section 
66 power to stop vehicles at random, the 
following observations may be made. It may 
be argued that an officer who uses section 
66 as a means to stop and detain drivers to 
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determine if a drink-driving offence has 
been committed, does not exercise the 
discretion in good faith. The power is not 
designed for this purpose, but rather as a 
means to enable an officer to acquire 
information. A more persuasive argument is 
that an officer in such cases includes in the 
exercise of the discretion to stop vehicles 
a factor which is irrelevant to the purpose 
of section 66 - the possibility that a 
motorist is intoxicated. Section 66 gives 
an officer a discretion to stop vehicles so 
as to acquire the driver or vehicle owner's 
details, usually so that a prosecution can 
commence. As Roper's case 76 decided, that 
is all section 66 allows. Yet the primary 
consideration in the exercise of the discretion 
to stop vehicles at a 'checkpoint' is the 
possibility that a motorist may have committed 
a drink-driving offence. It is submitted 
that this is not a relevant consideration for 
an officer to make in determining when to 
exercise the discretion given in section 66. 
It may be argued that in stopping vehicles at 
random no discretion is exercised at all, 
and an officer considers no factors. The 
3B 
decision is simply to stop the first vehicle 
to approach an officer when the officer is 
free. Yet even this will not make the use 
of section 66 valid. As stated earlier, the use 
of section 66 in circumstances where there is no 
intention or desire to seek the information 
allowed by the section, amounts to stopping 
vehicles for no purpose at all. It is 
suggested that this cannot be how Parliament 
intended the power to be used. 
In respect of the question of stopping 
vehicles at random, courts taking a similar 
approach to the approach taken in Mohammed-
Holgate's case 77 may well conclude that 
the exercise of the discretionary power to 
stop vehicles in such circumstances involves 
an unlawful detention. 
(iii) The view of the Minister of Transport 
While statements of Government Ministers 
have no authority in determining the law, 
both past and present Ministers of Transport 
have expressed doubt as to the validity 
under the existing law of stopping vehicles 
at random and breath testing drivers where 
I 
--
appropriate. The previous government went so 
far as to introduce a clause in the Transport 
Amendment Bill (No.4) 78 which would have 
allowed specifically for random stopping and 
breath testing. The clause was eventually 
excluded1 as the National Government of the 
time disliked the policy of random stopping. 
But there was, according to Mr Gair (the 
h M. . f ) 79 ten inister o Transport , 
much emphasis by opponents of the need 
to change the law on the decision of Mr 
Justice Quilliam in Police v. Roper, 
and the Court of Appeal has since overturned 
Roper's case. Mr Gair stated in a written 
question to the Honourable Mr Prebble in the 
House of Representatives that he had had80 
advice given in 1982 and 1983 on the 
matter (random stopping and breath 
testing] stressing the desirability of 
clarifying the legal authority under 
which the Ministry's officers operate. 
Mr Prebble's reply did not show total confidence 
· h , . 81 in t e current practice, saying 
if as is always possible with any 
legislation, the Court rules at some 
future date that the legislation allowing 
random stopping is defective, that is 
the time to ask Parliament for amending 
legislation. In my view, an early 
commencement of random stopping will save 
lives and prevent injuries. Amending 
legislation will be time consuming ... 
Mr Prebble's statements cannot be taken 
literally. Courts can never rule that 
"legislation ... is defective," because 
Parliament is sovereign. But Mr Prebble's 
statements seem to tacitly acknowledge that 
in stopping motorists at random and breath 
testing where appropriate, traffic officers 
are operating at the very edge of, and perhaps 
even beyond, the limits of their legal 
powers. The preceding analysis indicates it 
is a valid concern. 
(E) The Limits of Section 66 - A Summary 
If the scope of the section 66 power is not as 
wide as the Ministry of Transport previously 
considered, it is necessary to summarise how 
section 66 can be used 1 and when false imprisonment 
will arise. 
It is submitted that section 66 can only be used 
when an officer actually requires a driver or 
vehicle owner's details. Generally this will 
occur when the officer suspects the commission of 
an offence, although conceivably there may be 
other reasons. Section 66 does not, however, 
~I 
appear to allow an officer to stop vehicles at 
random, where the purpose of the stop is not to 
gain the information which the section permits, 
but rather to determine if an offence has been 
committed (particularly that of excess breath or 
blood alcohol). Further, following the cases of 
82 . 83 Roper and Winter , once a request has been 
made under section 66 for the relevant details, and 
that request has been complied with or refused, a 
motorist may leave. The motorist cannot be 
subsequently detained under section 66 for purposes 
such as ascertaining whether he or she has been 
drinking, or if the vehicle is unroadworthy. It 
is submitted that an officer may detain a motorist 
following a stopping under section 66, but can only 
do so where the officer uses the implied power 
given in anothe~ section. The decision to use the 
other power must be made during the period in 
which the information is being sought - or prior 
to the actual stopping - and section 66 may not be 
abused to give officers the necessary time to 
determine if there is good cause to invoke a 
subsequent power. 
If a traffic officer does misuse section 66 - or 
any of the other powers given in the Transport Act 
- and in doing so stops or detains a motorist, 
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then this will be a false imprisonment for which an 
officer may be liable. 
(F) False Imprisonment in Other Situations 
( i ) False imprisonment during the breath test process 
False imprisonment may still occur even when 
a motorist is validly stopped under section 
66 or is validly detained by the exercise of 
another power. Primarily there are two 
situations in which the tort may arise. The 
first is that false imprisonment may occur 
during the conducting of the breath testing 
procedures pursuant to section 58A. 
Under section 58A84 a traffic officer can 
only detain a motorist to undergo a breath 
. 85 h screening test were 'good cause to 
suspect' exists that either the person has 
been recently drinking, been in an accident 
or has commited an offence against the Act. 
If an officer does not have 'good cause to 
suspect', then by forcing a motorist to 
remain for a breath test/a false imprisonment 
will have occurred. Courts have illustrated 
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though, that 'good cause to suspect' is not a 
very onerous burden to fulfil, and a later 
Court will not examine too strictly the 
criteria on which an officer based his decision. 
It is also submitted that the breath testing 
provisions under section 58A must be exercised 
in good faith. The provisions could not be 
used simply as a general power to detain a 
motorist where no other authority to do so 
exists. The use of the power in this way 
would amount to "an ulterior and improper 
use of the power for purposes outside the 
object of t.he legislation 1186 . As such 
the detention would be a false imprisonment. 
Further occurrences of false imprisonment 
may arise in respect of section 58(3) - the 
11 . ., . . 87 A requirement to accompany provision n 
officer has the power to require a motorist 
to accompany him or her to a place where it 
is likely the motorist can undergo an 
evidential breath test or blood test, in 
situations where either a breath screening 
test is positive, or where a motorist refuses 
to undergo a breath screening test. In such 
situations the detention is perfectly lawful. 
A traffic officer can also require a motorist 
to accompany him or her for an evidential 
breath test or blood test 1 if a breath screening 
device is not readily available. This will 
not apply however . if an officer has acted in 
bad faith, perhaps by deliberately setting 
out without breath screening devices in an 
attempt to circumvent procedure. According 
to the Court in R v. Mangos 88 an officer's 
request in such circumstances would be 
illegal, and any detention would be likewise 
unlawful. Further, a motorist cannot be 
required to accompany an officer to undergo 
an initial breath screening test. The test 
can be administered either at the place 
where a motorist is, or at a nearby patrol 
89 car If no breath screening devices are 
available, then an officer's only recourse 
is to require the motorist to accompany him 
or her to undergo an evidential breath or 
blood test. As Connolly v. Ministry of 
90 Transport showed, a motorist who is 
compelled on threat of arrest to accompany an 
officer to undergo a breath screening test, 
is unlawfully detained. 
A person is only required to accompany an 
officer to a place where it is "likely that 
4S 
the person can undergo either an evidential 
breath test or a blood test 1191 • Thus, if 
an officer takes a person to a place where 
that officer has no evidence or belief on 
reasonable grounds that there are such 
facilities, then it will be a false 
imprisonment. This is because it is "a 
journey not contemplated by the Transport 
Act 1192 • It parallels the decision in 
Oaten v. McFadyen93 which found that 
continued detention after a valid arrest (or 
in this situation a valid requirement to 
accompany) is only legal if it is for 
legitimate purposes, reasonably connected 
with the original reason for the person's 
detention. The act of taking a person to a 
place where it is not likely that there will 
be breath or blood testing facilities is not 
detention for a legitimate purpose. 
This situation must be distinguished from a 
mere "broken journey" 9~ where an officer 
who detains a motorist stops briefly at some 
place for a reasonable purpose, before 
continuing to the site of the equipment. 
Under section 58E of the Transport Act this 
would probably be "reasonable compliance 1195 
with the Act's requirements, and thus would 
be legally justified. 
The other situation to be distinguished 1 is 
where an officer takes a person to a place 
where it is likely that there are testing 
facilities, but it turns out that no facilities 
are there. No false imprisonment arises here 
either, and indeed under section 58A(3)(a) 
an officer can even require that person to 
accompany him or her to another place for an 
evidential breath test. 
(ii) False imprisonment arising out of arrest 
The second situation where false arrest may 
occur is when an officer exercises or purports 
to exercise a power of arrest. A traffic 
officer has two general powers of arrest, 
set out below. 
S.58A(5) Every person commits an 
offence who -
(a) Having undergone a breath screening 
test pursuant to a requirement 
under this section, fails or refuses 
to remain at the place where he 
underwent the test until after the 
result of the test is ascertained; 
or 
(b) Fails or refuses to accompany an 
enforcement officer to any place, 
when required to do so pursuant to 
this section; or 
(c) Having accompanied an enforcement 
officer to any place pursuant to a 
requirement under this section, 
fails or refuses to remain at that 
place until he is required either 
to undergo an evidential breath 
test or a blood test pursuant to 
this Act or to accompany an enforcement 
officer to another place pursuant to 
this section; or 
(d) Having undergone an evidential breath 
test pursuant to a requirement under 
this section, fails or refuses to 
remain at the place where he underwent 
the test until after the result of 
the test is ascertained, -
and an enforcement officer may arrest him 
without warrant. 
S.62. Arrest of drivers under influence 
of drink or drugs - Any constable or 
traffic officer who has good cause to 
suspect that any person has committed an 
offence against subsection (2) of section 
55, paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of 
section 58 or section 59 of this Act may 
arrest that person without warrant. 
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Section 58A(5} is the most commonly used 
arrest power. This is because it sets out 
clearly the exact situations in which it can 
be exercised, and is only used when a motorist 
has first been required to participate in 
the breath test process. Thus when an 
arrest is made pursuant to section 58A(5}, 
there is very little chance that it will turn 
out to be a false imprisonment, unless an 
officer has acted in blatant disregard for 
procedure. 
There is more scope in an arrest under 
section 62 that it may amount to a false 
imprisonment. This is because it may involve 
the officer making a subjective analysis, in 
respect of one of the offences named in 
section 62, that a person is under the 
influence of drink or drug "to such an 
extent that he is incapable of having proper 
control of the vehicle 1196 • As a result of 
the need to make this judgement, officers 
will use section 62 only when a person is 
extremely intoxicated or a dangerous situation 
has developed, preferring instead to rely on 
the breath test procedure set out in section 
SBA. 
Even if an arrest is made under section 62, 
an officer only has to have had "good cause 
to suspect'' that one of the offences had been 
committed. This is not a very difficult 
burden to fulfil, andCourts will not usually 
rigorously scrutinise a traffic officer's 
decision to arrest. Unless it is blatantly 
unjustified, a Court will not seek to determine 
from hindsight whether the decision to 
arrest was correct in the circumstances. 
The main possibility of false imprisonment in 
the area of wrongful arrest occurs because a 
traffic officer has such limited powers of 
arrest. The powers given in section 62 and 
section 58A only allow an officer to arrest 
in situations where alcohol or drugs are 
involved. If another situation arises, no 
matter how serious - be it dangerous driving 
causing death, driving at a dangerous speed 
or even assault on a traffic officer - then 
an officer has no power to arrest under the 
Transport Act. A purported arrest in these 
situations will be a false imprisonment1 unless 
the action can be justified under the Crimes 
Act 1961. 
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Generally a traffic officer will not be able 
to rely on the Crimes Act "justification for 
II • 97 h • arrest sections w en arresting. The 
sections only justify or authorise arrests 
for offences against the Crimes Act, and a 
traffic officer will usually only arrest for 
offences against the Transport Act. Yet if 
an officer is assaulted in circumstances that 
98 . amount to aggravated assault , or witnesses 
99 an act amounting to manslaughter , then 
he or she could arrest the offender and ·rely 
on section 35 of the Crimes Act. This 
section justifies (that is, protects from 
civil and criminal liability) everyone who 
arrests either "any person whom he finds 
committing an offence against this Act for 
which the maximum punishment is not less 
than 3 years"lOO or, "any person whom he 
finds by night committing any offence against 
this Act 11101 • 
There are problems though, in relying on this 
justification section. The main problem is 
that if a person arrested by an officer can 
only be charged with a lesser offence under 
a different Act, or is acquitted of the charge, 
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then section 35 offers the arresting officer 
no protection. Section 35 only justifies 
the arrest of persons found committing offences 
against the Crimes Act 1961. This is subject 
to the possibility that a Court in New 
102 Zealand will follow the Wills v. Bowley , 
'l h' 103 R . B' 104 Wits ire v. Barrett , egina v. iron 
line of cases, which say that these words in 
such sections are read as "found apparently 
committing" an offence. If this interpretation 
was adopted, section 35 of the Crimes Act 
could still protect an officer from a 
tortious false imprisonment charge in the 
above situations. 
It is also possible that an officer who was 
assaulted could restrain an attacker and 
rely on section 48A of the Crimes Act as a 
protection. This allows anyone to use "in 
the defence of himself or another, such 
force as, in the circumstances as he believes 
them to be, it is reasonable to use". If 
the restraint could be seen as reasonable 
force in protecting himself or herself, then 
this would provide an officer with a defence 
to a false imprisonment charge. 
(G) The Defence of Consent 
A false imprisonment action can always be defea.ted 
by showing that the plaintiff consented to remain 
and was at all times free to leave. In the traffic 
situation it is necessary to see if a motorist 
who is stopped and detained by a traffic officer is 
consenting, and is free to leave at all stages. 
For if so, there can be no false imprisonment. 
The possibility of false imprisonment only arises 
if a traffic officer uses legal powers to stop and 
detain a motorist, so that a motorist must remain 
on threat of further sanction. In such a situation, 
a misuse of power by the traffic officer would 
amount to a false imprisonment. 
There is always some consent when an officer 
stops and detains a motorist. When a traffic 
officer flashes the lights on the patrol car or 
waves a torch at a motorist, that motorist does 
"consent" to pull over. Similarly, when an 
officer, having stopped a vehicle, asks a motorist 
a few questions (perhaps to see if the motorist 
has been drinking) or inspects the tyres on the 
vehicle, then the motorist does "consent" to 
remain. But this consent will not necessarily 
defeat a false imprisonment action. In the 
situations mentioned, a motorist does not believe 
there is any choice in either stopping, or in 
remaining once he or she has stopped. As such, the 
consent is no more than a motorist saving time and 
effort, because it is believed that even if a 
desire to leave is expressed (or if the motorist 
refuses to stop at all) then the officer will 
simply force the motorist to do so. 
The need for this element of 'choice' before 
consent could be regarded as genuine, was recognised 
in the case of Ambler v. Ministry of Transport, 
where it was held that105 
if the driver had voluntarily agreed to 
comply, no objection could be taken, but 
unless the driver had been made aware of 
the absence of any requirement to accompany 
the traffic officer, than the element of 
voluntariness would disappear. 
Thus the operative factor in a motorist stopping 
and remaining - or accompanying an officer - is 
not consent, but a traffic officer's exercise of 
power. If the power is misused
1
then a motorist 
will be unlawfully detained. 
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At this stage an analogy can be drawn with the 
interrogation cases. These cases also sought to 
determine whether a person was in the custody of 
the police (although not arrested), or was merely 
consenting to remain with the police, while at all 
times being free to leave. The purpose of the 
inquiry in those cases was to determine if a person 
was in custody, in order that the Police should 
conduct interrogation in accordance with the 
106 Judges Rules . But as the cases deal with a 
similar issue to the one arising in traffic 
situations, they offer some guidance as to the 
approach a later Court may adopt. 
A common theme runs through the cases in this 
area, d d . . 107 an accor ing to Savage Jin R v. Kurupo 
the cases show that a person can be in 
custody in terms of this rule [Rule one of 
the Judges Rules) if on reasonable grounds 
he considers that he would not be allowed to 
leave and is being held against his will. 
This follows the approach taken in the two Australian 
lOB d 'h R h ' cases R v. Amad , an Smit v. were it was 
·a109 sai 
Any person who is taken to a police station 
under such circumstances that be believes he 
must stay there is in the custody of the 
police. He may go only in response to an 
invitation from the Police that he should do 
SS 
so and the Police may have no power to 
detain him. But if the Poli~e act so as to 
make him think they can detain him, then he 
is in their custody. 
Similarly McCarthy J noted in R v. ConveryllO 
Certainly if a suspect is under physical 
restraint, or is led by Police conduct 
reasonably to believe that he may not leave, 
then to my mind he is in custody. · 
These findings of the Courts seem to apply to a 
motorist who is stopped by a traffic officer. 
Where a traffic officer flashes the patrol car's 
lights, or waves a motorist over, this is conduct 
which will reasonably cause that motorist to 
believe that there is no choice but to stop, and 
to remain stopped until the officer permits the 
motorist to go - therefore it is a form of "custody". 
Similarly, when an officer asks a motorist questions 
or inspects the car, then again the officer purports 
to act with legal authority, and the motorist 
reasonably believes that he or she must remain. 
In some situations an officer's conduct will add 
to this. Often a patrol car will be parked behind 
a motorist, while an officer stands alongside or 
in front of the motorist's vehicle. In such 
situations it becomes almost physically impossible 
for the motorist to leave. This is most evident 
Sb 
at a 'checkpoint', where a motorist is virtually 
"surrounded" by traffic officers. Here the physical 
act of departing is almost impossible until the 
inquiring officer permits it, and so the officer 
appears to be actively detaining the motorist. 
Two questions are raised by the interrogation 
cases. The first is that in all of them it was 
held that a person was in "custody" because the 
person was in police premises. However this fact 
does not appear conclusive. If a person is in 
police premises, it is simply one more factor -
albeit a very strong one - which causes the person 
to believe that he or she cannot depart, even if 
expressing a desire to do so. It adds to the 
feeling that there is no choice but to stay. In 
many cases the presence of one or more officers and 
a strategically positioned patrol car will have a 
similar effect. Particularly at a checkpoint, 
which virtually establishes a mobile "traffic 
station", the presence of officers and vehicles 
"en masse" will cause a similar feeling that a 
motorist must stay until an officer allows the 
motorist to go. 
The second problem the cases raise (and the point 
is emphasised in Kurupo's case 111 and Convery's 
112) . h h b case is tat t ere must every strong 
evidence that a person is being held against his 
or her will before that person can be regarded as 
being in custody. Such evidence is ideally provided 
by a person asking to leave, and having the request 
refused. But again this does not appear to be a 
conclusive factor. Custody will still exist 
whether or not a person protests, as long as that 
person believes on reasonable grounds that such a 
protest would have been to no avail. Thus in R v. 
Bass 113 the Court held that a person was in 
custody because even though he did not ask to 
leave, a policeman stated in evidence that had 
such a request been made, it would have been 
refused. 
This does not mean that on every occasion a law 
enforcement officer stops a member of the public, 
it will amount to an exercise of custody. The 
traffic situation, it is submitted, can be 
distinguished from the situation where a policeman 
approaches a person in the street to make inquiries, 
which usually does not involve custody. 
In the case of a pedestrian and a constable, there 
is never any deprivation of liberty. A pedestrian 
does not need to stop at a constable's request, 
and can speak with a constable without being 
obliged to stop. Thus there is a period of 
"negotiation", where a pedestrian can see if he or 
she wants to stay and talk to the constable, and 
if so, then there is consent to remain. 
The situation is vastly different with a motorist. 
When a traffic officer signals to a motorist, the 
motorist must pull over, must stop, and must wait 
to see what the officer requires. As a matter of 
necessity a motorist's journey must be interrupted. 
The positioning of the officer and the patrol car, 
especially at a checkpoint, may make it virtually 
impossible for a motorist to leave, even if wishing 
to do so. 
It is submitted therefore that a traffic officer 
does use his powers to stop and detain a motorist, 
and that the operation does not proceed by virtue 
of a motorist's consent. Further, a motorist 
would generally believe there is no choice but to 
stop and remain. It is not reasonable to expect a 
motorist to defy an officer's purported use of 
legal power, and drive off. This is especially 
true when an officer creates a situation where it 
is physically difficult for a motorist to depart. 
Thus if a traffic officer is misusing the powers 
to stop and detain vehicles, then any motorist 
stopped as a result, will be unlawfully detained. 
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF A FALSE IMPRISONMENT 
(A) An Action Against Who? 
It is submitted that a motorist who is falsely 
imprisoned can bring actions against two "people". 
First1 an action can be brought against the individual 
officer who committed the tortious false imprisonment 
and is thus personally responsible. 
The second action that can probably be brought is 
one against the Ministry of Transport itself. 
. . . 1 C ' 't 114 th ' Despite origina rown immuni y , ere is now 
no bar to bringing a tort action against a 
Government department. For the purpose of a tort 
action, the Ministry of Transport stands in the 
same position as if it were an ordinary civilian 
employer of the officer. Therefore, as long as a 
traffic officer commits the tortious act while in 
the course of employment, then the Ministry is 
vicariously liable for it. An officer will be 
regarded as acting in the 'the course of employment' 
at any time when he or she is on duty, unless what 
is done is so outrageous as to clearly involve a 
traffic officer having departed totally from this 
dutyll5 Essentially,whether a person is in the 
course of employment is a question of fact to be 
decided by the Court in each individual case. As 
almost all tortious false imprisonments will arise 
in respect of a traffic officer purporting to 
uphold the law and do his or her duty, then there 
will be little doubt that the officer is acting 
'in the course of employment'. In all such cases 
the Ministry of Transport will be vicariously 
liable for an officer's tortious acts. 
(B) The Duration of the False Imprisonment 
It is usually straightforward to determine the 
length of a false imprisonment. It begins when a 
person is first unlawfully detained, and ends when 
liberty is restored. When a traffic officer 
detains a motorist however, the situation is more 
complex. The question must be answered as to 
whether the false imprisonment will only end when 
the motorist regains freedom, or if there is a 
point when the unlawful custody becomes lawful. 
As was seen in the Privy Council decision in 
. k 116 th . Hussein v. Chong Foo Kam , ere is no reason 
why an unlawful detention cannot at some stage 
become lawful. It did in that case, where the Court 
held that an arrest which was illegal because no 
reasonable grounds for suspicion existed, became 
lawful when reasonable grounds for suspicion did 
. 1· . . 117 "i't arise. To quote Lord Dev in in Hussein , 
becomes a premature arrest, rather than one which 
was unjustifiable from first to last." 
A motorist who is stopped at random at a checkpoint 
under section 66 of the Transport Act, is falsely 
imprisoned if the officer has no intention of 
seeking the details allowed by section 66. If the 
motorist is then found to have committed an offence 
against section 58(l)(c) of the Transport Act 
(because the motorist is under the influence of 
drink to an extent that he or she is incapable of 
having proper control over the vehicle) and is 
arrested under section 62 of the Act, then this 
arrest will end the false imprisonment. The very 
point that is relevant here is the one expounded 
118 
in Blundell's case If one person wishes to 
deprive another of liberty, then that person must 
be able to point to a specific legal authority to 
do so. Here the section 62 arrest on reasonable 
grounds is such an authority, and so the false 
imprisonment ends when the lawful arrest occurs. 
The result is similar if a motorist is either 
stopped by an improper use of section 66 in other 
circumstances, or if section 66 is used lawfully 
initially, but a motorist is detained under its 
authority for longer than the section permits. The 
false imprisonment will end either when the 
motorist's liberty is restored, or when an officer 
uses another power (perhaps section 68B or section 
SBA) so that the motorist is lawfully detained by 
the authority which that section gives. This view 
is submitted with the possibility still existing 
that a later Court may adopt a strict interpretation 
119 
of Roper's case and rule that~ other powers 
can be used following a stopping under section 66. 
If a later Court ruled this way, then all such 
exercises of powers following the use of section 
66 would be illegal, and damages could be sought 
for the whole period of the detention. 
In most other cases where an officer acts outside 
the legal power given and in doing so detains a 
motorist - perhaps during the breath test process 
- then the length of the false imprisonment can be 
simply determined on the facts. 
(C) Damages 
The aim of a tort action generally, is to compensate 
a victim for loss. There is little point in merely 
proving someone is liable in tort unless worthwhile 
damages can be gained. It thus becomes necessary 
to determine if there is any real chance of gaining 
reasonable damages from an action in tort in the 
situations discussed. 
In many cases it will be almost worthless to bring 
an action in tort. If a plaintiff sues the Ministry 
of Transport for the commission of a minor tort 
which occurred while the plaintiff was being 
apprehended for a serious crime, then it is doubtful 
the Courts will take a sympathetic view of the 
action. To quote Cumming-Bruce W commenting on a 
situation of this type in Morris v. Beardmore, 
"whether he [ the plaintiff) would expect to get 
damages of more than a shilling is another 
120 
matter." 
Similarly, if the tort that occurs is not very 
serious and an officer has acted both reasonably 
and in good faith, then a Court will not award any 
substantial sum of damages. Also, should either 
random stopping or the act of stopping under 
section 66 and then going on to use another power 
be held to be a tortious false imprisonment, then 
a Court may choose to award only nominal damages, 
because of the "flood" of claims that would otherwise 
follow. In these latter cases the false imprisonment 
arises not out of any deliberately illegal conduct 
by a traffic officer, but out of a technical 
mistake made in a very uncertain area of the law. 
For this reason also, it is submitted that Courts 
are unlikely to make a significant award of damages. 
It must be remembered however, that damage or loss 
per se is not relevant to a trespass action, and 
therefore to false imprisonment. Any imprisonment, 
no matter how short, is prima facie actionable. 
Damages are assessed for primarily non-pecuniary 
loss - in the case of false imprisonme;:it "generally 
it is not a pecuniary loss
11122 which is compensated 
for, "but a loss of dignity and the like and is 
1 f h h 
, I d • • ,.123 et muc tote Jury s 1scret1on The 
principal heads of damage appear to be injury to 
liberty, that is "loss of time considered primarily 
from a non-pecuniary point of view
11124 and the 
• ' t f 1 ' th t • II the ' d ' ' t II 
12 5 
inJury o ee ings, a is in 1gn1 y 
126 
McGregor on Damages also points out that a 
jury will not break down the damages into categories, 
but will give an award of general damages which it 
sees as fair. Further, although it is unlikely to 
occur in false imprisonment cases involving a 
traffic officer - because the length of the 
imprisonment will be relatively short - damages 
can also be claimed for pecuniary loss if it is 
not too remote to be recoverable. This would 
include "any loss of general business or 
employment 11127 , while "the plaintiff's costs 
. . . h. . h .,128 1 incurred in procuring is disc arge may a so 
be recoverable as damages. 
How this will be applied in practice is unclear, 
as there is almost no case law involving claims 
against the Ministry of Transport. But liberty is 
a highly prized value in society, and people who 
interfere with the liberty of another without 
justification are dealt with strictly by the 
Courts. This is especially so when it is the very 
people who symbolise law and order that commit the 
offence. Thus if a traffic officer commits a 
serious example of a false imprisonment, acts 
without care or in bad faith, then it is submitted 
that a substantial award of damages may be gained, 
and an action is worthwhile. 
A relevant case is Brockie v. Lower Hutt City
129 
There a carrier was stopped by traffic officers 
for "no more than fifteen to twenty minutes
11130 , 
while a dispute was sorted out as to whether the 
carrier was disqualified from driving. It was the 
third time the carrier had been stopped and he was 
lawfully entitled to drive. False imprisonment 
was found by the Court, and there was an award to 
the plaintiff of ten thousand dollars general 
damages, and one thousand dollars aggravated 
damages. In a later motion for a new triallJOA 
Quilliam J stated that while this was a very high 
award of damages, it was not so excessive as to 
warrant setting it aside. 
A close examination of Brockie's case
131 reveals 
that the Court considered many factors in awarding 
damages, including: the length of time of the 
detention; the reasonableness of the traffic 
officer's conduct; whether the plaintiff asserted 
his rights and the officer's reaction to this; the 
attitude of the traffic officer and the hurt to 
the plaintiff's feelings. Considering the short 
length of time of the imprisonment, and a finding 
that the officer acted in good faith, the jury 
appears to have taken a very severe view of the 
corcunission of the tort. 
It is submitted therefore that even if a motorist 
is unlawfully detained for only a short time -
perhaps at a checkpoint or during the breath test 
procedures - then an action may be worth bringing. 
This is especially so if the motorist has committed 
no offence. The jury at least in Brockie's case 132 
was willing to award substantial damages to a 
wrongfully imprisoned citizen. 
It is submitted that a motorist who is falsely 
imprisoned may also seek an award of aggravated 
damages,because "the manner in which the false 
imprisonment is effected may lead to aggravation 
133 ... of the damage and hence the damages" . In 
Brockie's case this was stated as circumstances 
because of which "this deprivation of liberty was 
made worse for him than it might otherwise have 
been 11134 and which could not be adequately 
compensated by general damages. This reflects the 
idea that false imprisonment may not only cause a 
loss of liberty and dignity, but may also cause 
humiliation, and damage to a person's reputation. 
As noted in Walter v. Alltools135 a case concerned 
with factors that may be considered in assessing 
damages for false imprisonment, an extra (or 
lesser) amount of damages is to be awarded depending 
on "any evidence which tends to aggravate or 
mitigate the damage to a man's reputation which 
fl f h 
. . ,.136 ows naturally rom t e imprisonment . Lord 
Hailsham confirmed this approach and stated in 
Broome v. Cassell that aggravated damages may 
include sums for "loss of reputation, for injured 
feelings, for outraged morality, and to enable a 
plaintiff to protect himself against future calumny 
or outrage of a similar kind 11137 • Therefore 
aggravated damages may be awarded in situations 
where the imprisoner's attitude, or the circumstances 
of the imprisonment, worsen the indignity suffered 
by a person, or cause his or her reputation to 
suffer in the eyes of peers. 
Aggravated damages are to be distinguished from 
exemplary damages, which are awarded in far fewer 
cases and only where the defendant's conduct is 
extreme. The decision of the House of Lords in 
138 l d . 1 · . h Rookes v. Barnard pace strict 1m1ts on t e 
awarding of exemplary damages, and Lord Devlin 
confined the Court's right to award them to three 
specific situations. Courts in New Zealand however, 
have been reluctant to limit themselves in the way 
suggested in Rookes' case. As was stated in 
Taylor v. Beere139 and Donselaar v. Donselaar
140 
exemplary damages will still be awarded to punish 
a defendant where the "quality of the conduct
11141 
warrants it. If conduct is extreme, and shows an 
"arrogant disregard for any rights the plaintiff 
142 
ma.y have had" or is malicious or oppressive, 
143 
then as Jamieson Salvage and Tow Company v. Murray 
illustrated, exemplary damages will still be 
awarded. Even if a later New Zealand Court was to 
144 
follow Rookes v. Barnard , the second category 
stated by Lord Devlin where exemplary damages may 
be awarded was "oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitutional action by servants of the 
145 Government" • It is suggested that traffic 
officers would come within this category and thus 
exemplary damages could be sought against an 
officer in a New Zealand Court, where the false 
imprisonment was of an extreme or oppressive 
nature. 
It is therefore submitted that in circumstances 
where a traffic officer unlawfully detains 
a motorist then an action in tort may be worth 
while, and substantial damages could possibly 
be awarded. This is most probable when a motorist 
has committed no offence. However if the tort 
occurs when an officer is acting reasonably and in 
good faith, or if it occurs as a result of a 
technical breach of the law in an uncertain area, 
it is doubtful that a Court will make a large 
award of damages against an officer. 
(D) Exclusion of Evidence in Criminal Cases 
The commission by a traffic officer of a tort such 
as false imprisonment may have other consequences 
in addition to giving rise to an action for damages. 
In certain circumstances Judges will exercise a 
discretion to exclude evidence in criminal cases 
where it it gained through tortious conduct, although 
at least in New Zealand, it is a rare occurrJnce. 
Generally the commission of a tort will not lead 
to the exclusion of evidence. Thus if a traffic 
officer assaults a person, or unlawfully detains 
that person, or trespasses on his or her property 
to make an arrest, evidence will not be excluded 
unless the evidence was gained while the tort was 
being committed. Even where evidence is gained 
during the commission of a tort, the general rule 
is that the evidence will not be excluded, unless 
it is unfairly gained (in the sense that it is 
· d b ' k 146 ) . f . t b t. l gaine y a tric , or 1 1 s pro a ive va ue 
147 
is outweighed by its prejudicial effect . 
Thus even evidence gained by an illegal search
148 
will still be admissible. 
There is now a tendencey towards excluding evidence 
gained through illegal means as a way of disciplining 
149 
the police. Thus in R v. Hannah , Casey J 
excluded physical evidence because it was gained 
,1 
by the police through an illegal detention - in 
that case the persons were detained for several 
days until capsules of drugs concealed in bodily 
cavities were excreted. The authority of this 
decision on later cases is unclear. Several 
recent New Zealand decisions, including R v. 
Coombs 150 in the Court of Appeal, have impl'ied 
that R v. Kuruma
151 is still the binding decision 
on New Zealand Courts, and that consequently, 
evidence gained by illegal means will still be 
admitted, subject only to the fairness principle. 
To quote the Court in R v. Coombs, 
evidence obtained by illegal searches and 
the like is admissible, subject only to a 
discretion based on the jurisdiction to 
prevent abuse of process to rule it out in 
particular instances on grounds of unfairness 
152 
to the accused. 
Despite the decision in Coombs' 
153 case , it 
still must be open to a defendant in a criminal 
case to ask for evidence to be excluded, if it was 
gained by a traffic officer through the commission 
of a tort. By analogy with the principle in R v. 
Hannah154 , breath test evidence might be excluded 
as a means of disciplining the Traffic Department, 
if an officer falsely imprisoned a motorist during 
the breath test process. The unlawful detention 
in this situation will be of far shorter duration 
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than in Hannah's case - a matter of a few 
hours, often less, as compared with several days. 
But breath and blood alcohol offences have far 
less serious penalties than a charge of drug 
trafficking. It does not seem unreasonable that a 
Court might balance the seriousness of the crime 
committed with the seriousness of the tort committed 
to gain the evidence, in order to determine if 
156 
evidence ought to be excluded . If such an 
approach were adopted, then where an officer 
unlawfully detains a motorist, all evidence gained 
during the detention may be excluded. 
The decision to exclude evidence remains at all 
times a matter of judicial discretion in individual 
cases. A judge will not therefore exclude evidence 
if it would be against the interest of justice to 
Th i'f ' ' f I 157 do so. us a strict view o Ropers case 
was adopted, so that most breath tests taken 
following a stopping under section 66 involved a 
false imprisonment, then judges are unlikely to 
exclude the breath test evidence obtained. 
In practice, Courts seem to be reluctant to exclude 
evidence gained through the commission of a false 
imprisonment. A relevant example is White v. 
158 
Ministry of Transport where the decision of 
the District Court Judge to admit evidence was not 
interfered with by the High Court, despite an 
admitted false imprisonment of White by a traffic 
officer. Evidence was however excluded in Stowers 
. ·1159 b f th v. Auckland City Counc1 ecause o e 
commission of a tort - in that case an assault of 
some violence. The decision to exclude evidence is 
a matter of degree and balance, with the decision 
to admit evidence usually dominating, except where 
the tort committed is especially serious. 
The exclusion of evidence which is gained by an 
officer's tortious conduct is to be distinguished 
from the exclusion of breath and blood test 
results for reason that the statutory procedures 
were not complied with. The two are separate 
issues, with the latter involving no unlawful 
conduct on the officer's behalf, and being subject 
to the provisions about "reasonable compliance" 
contained in section 58E. Evidence is also excluded 
160 
on the ground that it was gained by undue pressure . 
This is not relevant here except to the extent 
that the undue pressure could be tortious. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has submitted that there are a number of 
areas where a traffic officer could unlawfully detain a 
motorist. Some of these situations arise because an 
officer departs from the procedure which the law lays 
down. This is unfortunate, but is a problem that 
cannot be remedied as long as human nature remains 
fallible. Of more concern is false imprisonment that 
arises because of uncertainty in the law, and uncertainty 
as to the powers a traffic officer possesses. The case 
of Roper v. Police161 has introduced substantial 
doubts about the current law and practice of traffic 
officers. Whether an officer can stop vehicles at 
random and whether, or in what circumstances, an officer 
can use other powers following a stopping under 
section 66 are two major areas of doubt. It is important 
that Parliament confronts these issues and legislates 
the answers clearly. At present1 section 66 is the only 
power to stop moving vehicles which a traffic officer 
possesses. As such it is stretched to cover a multitude 
of varied situations, determined by departmental policy. 
It is submitted that this is a dangerous practice. 
Parliament is the law maker in our constitution and it 
is the appropriate body to determine when a traffic 
officer has the power to infringe the liberty of a 
motorist. 
The question is most contentious in the arP.a of random 
stopping of vehicles. If the Government wishes to give 
the Ministry of Tra.nsport' s officers a power to stop 
vehicles at random, then it should initiate a Iaw in 
. 162 Parliament . Stopping vehicles at random breaches 
a fundamental right of every citizen that unless acting 
illegally, his or her liberty should not be interfered 
with. By its very nature, stopping at random will 
involve the infringement of the liberty of a great 
number of innocent people in circumstances where there 
was never even any cause to suspect they had committed 
offences. A power with such a significant constitutional 
impact,in addition to the obvious practical inconvenience 
it causes the motorist, ought not to be introduced by a 
departmental directive. The proper place for the 
decision to be made is Parliament, where the peoples' 
elected representatives can debate the constitutional 
consequences of the scheme. 
The present introduction of random stopping is particularly 
concerning because of the very real doubt as to its 
legality under the current law. It is submitted that 
th ' ' f I ( • , ) 163 e Minister o Transports comments cited earlier 
are not acceptable. The comments imply that there is 
7b 
doubt as to whether a power exists to stop at random 
under the current law, but that the practice will go 
ahead in order to introduce the scheme without the delay 
which amending legislation would involve. If the 
Government wishes to give traffic officers these powers, 
then it should do so openly in the form of a law and 
accept the political consequences. To conduct the 
practice in an area of admitted legal doubt is an 
unfortunate approach to take. If random stopping is to 
be carried out, then there are questions that must be 
answered. Should a standard procedure be laid down? 
What is the uniform requirement? When should 'checkpoints' 
be set up? Where should they be situated?
164 These 
are questions that Parliament must answer or at least 
give guidance on. 
A more substantive question is whether the practice of 
stopping vehicles at random is desirable at all. The 
Australian Law Reform Commission in its report entitled 
"Alcohol, Drugs and Driving 11165 , decided against the 
need for a similar scheme in Australia. There are also 
arguments that stopping vehicles at random is 
inconsistent with parts of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights which New Zealand has 
ratified, and which guarantees that "no-one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary detentiorl~
66 and that ''no-one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
. h h' . ,.167 wit is privacy To a varying degree, stopping and 
detaining vehicles at random infringes both these 
rights. The Covenant168 is not part of our internal 
law, but there is a general constitutional principle 
that our internal law should not be inconsistent with 
our international obligations. Further, if a Bill of 
Rights was to be introduced in New Zealand, similar to 
h d . h h' 169 h . tat propose in t e current w ite paper , ten it 
is submitted that stopping vehicles at random would be 
inconsistent with it. The proposed Bill contains a 
provision which guarantees freedom from •• unreasonable 
II 170 search or seizure of "person or property" On a 
virtually identical provision in the Constitution of 
the United States of America 171 , that country's 
Supreme Court held in Delaware v. Prouse172 that 
random stopping was unconstitutional. 
The main concern of this author remains however, the 
uncertainty of the law in the traffic area. To quote 
Sir Robin Cooke in Dixon v. Auckland City Counci1173 
The breath and blood alcohol legislation has grown 
up piecemeal and is undesirably complex and difficult. 
We think that a thorough revision and simpler code 
are desirable. We venture to suggest that this is 
a task calling for special attention, since the 
field is one involving both the safety of the 
public, and the liberty of the subject. 
174 Roper's case has raised many doubts as to where the 
limits of the law in this area now lie. It is 
Parliament's task to take these questions in hand, and 
decide what powers a traffic officer should possess. 
In an area where individual liberty is to be infringed, 
the paramount duty is to make these limits clear. All 
New Zealanders have a right to expect this. 
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